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In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of
cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain’s job is to predict
whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences.
Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents,
such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information
processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark’s
seminal formulation must include not only the temporal dimension (i.e., what is perceived
now) but also the spatial dimension (i.e., what is perceived here or next-to-my-body).
In this paper, we propose to focus on perceptual experiences that happen “next,” i.e.,
close-to-my-body. This is because perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs has
a key impact on the organism’s survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences
mediated by the skin and what we will call the “extended skin” or “second skin,” that
is, immediate objects/materials that envelop closely to our skin, namely, clothes. We
propose that the skin and tactile experiences are not a mere border separating the self
and world. Rather, they simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily
self to its environment. Hence, these proximal and pervasive tactile experiences can be
viewed as a “transparent bridge” intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between
the self and the physical and social world. We conclude with potential implications of this
observation for the case of Depersonalization Disorder, a condition that makes people
feel estranged and detached from their self, body, and the world.
Keywords: self-awareness, touch, altered states of consciousness, depersonalization, body schema, body image,
predictive processing
INTRODUCTION
In daily life, we experience ourselves as constantly immersed in an ongoing flow of sensory signals
(smells, sounds, images, etc.) emerging from both inside and outside our bodies. These sensations
and perceptions scaffold both (a) a sense of self, i.e., the subjective first-personal “I” or “self,” bound
to my body and distinct from the world and others (Gallagher, 2000; see Qin et al., 2020 for a recent
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review). And, (b) a sense of presence, i.e., the feeling that
I am immersed and in direct touch with a real world
here and now (Seth et al., 2011). Perceptual experiences are
traditionally regarded as the fundamental point of contact of
an experiencing subject with external, mind-independent1 world
situated “out there.”
The past decades have witnessed an “embodied turn” in
examining perception from a situated, embodied and dynamic
viewpoint. The body is not viewed anymore as a mere “material”
or “physical” support system for transporting and fueling the
mind and brain. Rather minds and brains are designed to support
the maintenance and survival of a body within a wider and
potentially threatening physical and social environment (Varela
et al., 1991; Gallagher, 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007;
Thompson, 2007).
In line with this approach, recent work within the influential
Predictive Processing (PP) framework suggested that biological
agents, such as humans, are “pro-active survival-enabled
prediction machines” (Clark, 2013, p. 1) that must optimally
maintain their bodily states within the required limits for
survival and reproduction purposes2 (Friston, 2008; Hohwy,
2013; Fotopoulou, 2015; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). To complete
this difficult task, the human brain generates its own internal
self- and world-models by extracting statistical patterns of
relevant information (Conant and Ross Ashby, 1970; Friston,
2005; Friston and Stephan, 2007). These self- and world-models
are constructed moment-by-moment at various levels of the
hierarchical processing (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013).
In this view, the main function of perceptual experiences
is ultimately geared toward self-preservation. Perceptions are
underpinned at the neural level by dynamically shifting
generative models “predicting” what is causing incoming sensory
events, based on Bayesian probabilistic “guesses” about the likely
causes of any incoming sensory information (Friston, 2008;
Hohwy, 2013; Fotopoulou, 2015). Incoming sensory inputs are
then contrasted or “matched” against learned (or innate) patterns
constituting what are called “predictions.” When a prediction
does not match ongoing sensory input, then a “prediction error”
results, which may have the effect of updating the prediction.
It has been proposed that a system’s ability to attenuate or
to “forget” boring (i.e., predictable, unsurprising) information
enables the agent to select “newsworthy” information. For
example, when picking a ripe cherry from a tree (Limanowski
and Friston, 2020), we seem to be very sensitive to the feel of the
cherry, as we touch and grasp it. Yet, we are almost insensitive
to the feelings of our arm and eye movements while reaching the
cherry. However, these inputs are key in ensuring we successfully
pick the ripe cherry, and not the green one next to it.
1For example, Crane and French (2015) note that: “perceptual experience, in its
character, involves the presentation (as) of ordinary mind-independent objects to a
subject, and such objects are experienced as present or there such that the character
of experience is immediately responsive to the character of its objects”.
2We recently had the chance to see this hypothesis at work during the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic: many of us experienced major difficulties to focus on
abstract tasks, our attention being constantly attracted to the concrete conditions
that threaten our lives and those of our loved ones.
Importantly, a self-organizing system, such as the human
body, is most intimately acquainted with self -related signals. This
means that the problem the brain has to solve is often “not which
sensory evidence to emphasise, but which to attenuate” (Parr
et al., 2018; Limanowski and Friston, 2020, p. 8, original italics).
One key observation here is that perceptions and beliefs about the
self are unique, in the sense that they are “necessarily transparent”
(Limanowski and Friston, 2018, p. 5; Ciaunica et al., 2020).
Indeed, it has been suggested that in daily life and under normal
circumstances, there is a basic, embodied and pre-reflective sense
of self that is “transparent.”
As we will see shortly in more detail, the property of
“transparency” has been spelled out in a variety of different ways
by different theorists (Moore, 1903; Harman, 1990; Tye, 1999;
Metzinger, 2003; Sass and Parnas, 2003; Fuchs, 2005; Ciaunica
et al., 2020). The basic idea is that transparent processing gives
us the feeling of having direct access to what our experiences are
about, or directed at. Crucially, this model applies not only to
our perception of the external world but also to self-models: “just
as a transparent world-model grants the experience of being in
immediate touch with the world, a transparent phenomenal self-
model... affords the experience of being in immediate relation to
a self ” (Metzinger, 2003; Limanowski and Friston, 2018, p. 2).
A detailed overview of the PP literature, its advocates and
opponents, lies beyond our scope here. In this paper, we retain
and build upon the key and largely non-controversial idea that
perceptual processing in the here and now is fundamentally
geared toward self-preservation (Clark, 2013).
If this is so, then one may pay careful attention to perceptual
processing taking place not only in the next second, but literally
next-to-my-body. In this paper, we propose to shift the focus on
the perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs (literally
“next-to-the-self ”), and more specifically on touch which has
a key impact on the organism’s survival. In line with seminal
paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and
the future of cognitive science” by Clark (2013), we suggest that
the term “next” should be understood not only at the temporal
scale (i.e., what is perceived in the upcoming second) but also
from a spatial dimension (i.e., what is perceived literally next to
or close-to-my-body).
There are at least two main reasons this shift in focus toward
what is happening in proximity to the body. (1) First, as de
Vignemont (2018) rightfully notices, the perception of a snake
next-to-my foot is essentially different from the perception of the
moon in the sky in terms of survival outcome. Indeed, standard
accounts tacitly privileged a visuospatial model of perception,
which is easily understandable insofar as healthy adults seem
to be presented with a continuous visual field devoid of any
phenomenological boundary between what is close and what
is far (de Vignemont, 2018). Yet, there is growing interest in
highlighting the inherent multisensory and proximal nature of
perceptual experiences as they unfold throughout the lifespan
(Noë, 2004; Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, 2017; Faivre et al., 2017;
Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018; Ciaunica
and Crucianelli, 2019; Barwitch, 2020).
(2) Second, if our current perceptual experiences are
indeed infused and structured by previous “priors” or
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“expectations,” then it becomes crucial to understand how
perceptual experiences unfold, dynamically, from a bottom-up
developmental perspective. Indeed, in real life, human beings
are not emerging as fully-fledged adults–like Athena famously
emerged from Zeus’ head–but they gradually develop from cells
to a human body within another human body (Fotopoulou and
Tsakiris, 2017; Ciaunica, 2019; Ciaunica and Crucianelli, 2019;
Quintero and de Jaegher, 2020; Ciaunica et al., 2021). As we will
see shortly, endorsing a dynamic bottom-up viewpoint points us
to the idea that touch, before vision, plays a fundamental role
in constituting self- and world-models in early life and beyond
(Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017; Ciaunica and Crucianelli, 2019).
Indeed, humans have proximal and “direct sensible
acquaintance” (James, 1890) with others’ bodies (via skin-to-skin
interactions) well before they meet others’ minds (via face-to-
face and eye gaze interactions) (Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, 2017;
Ciaunica et al., 2021). We argue that paradoxically, precisely
because tactile proximal inputs are ubiquitous, they tend to
be “transparently” processed “in the background,” typically
unnoticed and taken for granted. Yet, they constitute the
fundamental “invisible” roots of our sense of self and sense of
presence in the world.
We unpack these ideas below, and we proceed as follows:
In the Perceptual Awareness and the Transparent Experiential
Background section, we define the notion of “transparency,” and
we explore the phenomenological idea that proximal sensory
inputs (e.g., olfactory, proprioceptive, tactile, interoceptive) are
blended to form a tacit “background existential orientation”
(Ratcliffe, 2008). Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences as
pervasive yet essential components of our everyday life, forming
a baseline and transparent experiential background.
The Getting Perception off the Ground: The Basic Proximal
Senses section motivates the claim that tactile experiences
may precede more sophisticated forms of detached and distal
perceptual awareness—such as visuospatial perception (e.g.,
seeing an apple). Indeed, well before humans are able to recognize
themselves in a mirror and to perceive themselves from a
visuospatial distal perspective, they experience themselves and
their surroundings via proximal senses. We review empirical
developmental findings pointing to the key role of touch in
constituting perceptual experiences in early life and beyond.
In the (Un)Covering our Body—Extending the Transparency
to the “Second Skin” section, we tackle a relatively overlooked
aspect of our tactile experiences, namely, the fact that with
rare exceptions, humans in modern societies spend most of
their lives having their bodies closely enveloped by clothes.
We focus on tactile experiences that extend to the immediate
objects/materials that envelop closely our skin. Following the
seminal “extended mind” thesis (Clark and Chalmers, 1998;
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019), we argue that these materials
may be conceived as a “second skin” or “extended skin” that
underwrite what we will call here “extended body-image” and
“body-schema” (cf. Gallagher, 2005).
Finally, in The Transparent Bridge—Bodily Connectedness
Through Proximal Senses section, we suggest that tactile
experiences–mediated by the skin and the “extended skin” –
may be viewed as a “transparent bridge” intrinsically relating and
facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social
world. We build upon the observation that the skin and tactile
experiences have an inherent dual function: it simultaneously
separates and relates our bodily self to the physical and social
world. Touchmediates indeed our self-presence in the world. We
thus hypothesize that close tactile engagements with the social
and physical environment play a fundamental role in shaping
both our sense of self and sense of presence or immersiveness
in the world. We briefly discuss some potential implications
of this observation for the case of Depersonalization Disorder,
a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached
from their self, body, and the world. We conclude with some
potential implications of our hypotheses for designing bodily
and interactive interventions aiming to alleviate the symptoms
of depersonalization. If our hypotheses are correct, then it is
paradoxically by inviting depersonalization people to “forget”
their self and to get closer to the world and others that they may
start to get closer to their “lost” self.
PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS AND THE
TRANSPARENT EXPERIENTIAL
BACKGROUND
Perceptual awareness is typically described as having a polarized
subject–object structure whereby an experiencing subject
perceives an “external” world/object “out there.” Traditionally, it
has been proposed that one becomes aware of one’s self when one
is able to perceive oneself as an object of one’s awareness and to
see oneself through others’ eyes (Carruthers, 1996). For example,
when I see myself in a mirror, I recognize myself as an individual
distinct from the world and others. But also, I can see myself as
others see me, from a third-person perspective.
However, as James (1890) pointed out, before we see ourselves
as others see us, we perceive ourselves and our bodies through
feelings. The most fundamental way to get to know oneself is
through feelings, not thought: “For this central part of the Self
is felt... It is at any rate no mere ens rationis, cognized only in an
intellectual way, and no mere summation of memories or mere
sound of a word in our ears. It is something with which we also
have direct sensible acquaintance... when it is found, it is felt; just
as the body is felt” (James, 1890, p. 298–299 original italics; bold
our emphasis).
Indeed, a long-standing phenomenological tradition pointed
out that among the objects that an experiencing subject perceives
in the world throughout her life, the body has a special status
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). For example, Husserl famously wrote
that the body is not just an object that is perceived but also that
through which we perceive: “The Body [Leib] is, in the first place,
the medium of all perception; it is the organ of perception and is
necessarily involved in all perception” (Husserl, 1989, p. 61). The
body follows the experiential subject everywhere, like a shadow,
for better and for worse (Legrand, 2006).
In line with these ideas, it has been proposed that all
experiences include a “background existential orientation”
constituted by bodily feelings: “the feeling is the way in which one
finds oneself in the world and the way in which one finds oneself
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in the world participates in all experience, albeit as something
that is usually pre-reflectively taken for granted” (Ratcliffe, 2008,
p. 140).
The idea of an existential bodily background has
been highlighted in neuroscience research. For example,
Damasio writes:
“I am postulating another variety of feeling which I suspect
preceded the others in evolution. I call it background feeling
because it originates in ‘background’ body states rather than in
emotional states. It is not the Verdi of grand emotion, nor the
Stravinsky of intellectualized emotion but rather a minimalist in
tone and beat, the feeling of life itself, the sense of being. (...) The
background feeling is our image of the body landscape when it is
not shaken by emotion. (...) I submit that without them the very
core of your representation of self would be broken” (Damasio,
1994, p. 150–151, our italics).
The lived body is the feeling body that remains tacitly, and
one could say “transparently” in the background3. In the
remainder of this paper, we build upon the idea that these bodily
feelings constitute a pervasive and “transparent” experiential
background, which can be attended or altered, i.e., “opaque” or
“broken” (Fuchs, 2005; Ciaunica et al., 2020).
Transparency can be intuitively grasped via the “window”
metaphor: a clear and transparent window glass or sliding door
can give us the illusion of an unmediated access to the outside
world. However, although we subjectively feel that we are directly
in touch with one’s inner self and the outer world, in reality, our
experiences aremediated through certain states or processes that
are transparent, pervasive, and tacitly taken for granted (Fuchs,
2005; Ciaunica et al., 2020).
As we saw earlier in the Introduction section, the notion
of “transparency” has been theoretically spelled out in different
ways by different theorists (Moore, 1903; Harman, 1990; Tye,
1999; Metzinger, 2003), and a detailed review of these accounts
lies beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we restrict our focus
on the property of transparency of perceptual experiences. To
get a clear intuitive grip on this idea, consider the following
example: I am on a street, and I hesitate to turn my head left
or right. Eventually, I turn my head left, and I realize that I
chose this direction, because I have perceived with the corner
of my eye the label of a French bistro. Suddenly, I realize that
I am hungry, and the reason why I turned my head into that
direction is because my brain, concerned by my bodily survival,
detected some relevant “transparent” background information,
that is now brought forward, at the surface of my awareness (the
smell of delicious French cuisine, say). Consequently, I engage
in self-regulatory behavior, and I walk toward the bistro and
order escargots.
Here, we restrict our focus on the property of transparency
of experiences (and leave aside the property of transparency of
3As Merleau-Ponty writes: “in so far as it sees or touches the world, my body can
be neither seen nor touched. What prevents its ever being an object, ever being
‘completely constituted’ is that it is that by which there are objects. It is neither
tangible nor visible in so far as it is that which sees and touches.” (Merleau-Ponty,
1962, p. 92).
mental representations4 or processes). Note that it is important
to distinguish, in our view, between (a) what is non-conscious
but can be in principle consciously attended (brought into the
focus of the attention; e.g., the visual stimuli of a bistro label
or the interoceptive signals of my hungriness); and (b) what
is non-conscious and cannot be consciously attended (e.g., the
firing of my neurons while I perceive the French bistro; or the
metabolic exchanges between my blood and my organs). Only
the former information, but not the latter, can be processed
“transparently” because only (a) but not (b) can be attended, and
thereby become “opaque.”
In what follows, we explore the idea that our tacit
“background existential orientation” is essentially underpinned
by proximal sensory inputs (e.g., olfactory, proprioceptive, tactile,
and interoceptive) that are blended to form an experiential
“transparent” background. These signals are so pervasive and
yet so essential to our being in the world that they seem to
form a baseline and taken for granted experience. Specifically,
we focus on touch5 and tactile experiences for three interrelated
main reasons. First, touch is mediated by the skin, the oldest and
widest organ in terms of dimensions and functions (Montagu,
1971; Field, 2001; see Gallace and Spence, 2010 for a review). By
providing the organism with the most primitive means to “meet”
and perceive the world, tactile experiencesmay constitute thereby
the most ubiquitous and basic experiential background.
Second, the skin mediates the boundary between the self
and the outer world, and as such, tactile experiences display
an inescapably dual “touchant/touché” structure (Merleau-Ponty,
1962). By gaining information about the world via touch,
the subject inherently gains information about her “self ” too.
Indeed, while proprioception, kinaesthesia, and interoceptive of
visceral inputs are phenomenologically inextricable components
of the existential background feeling, tactile experiences because
they play a special relational or dual role: “tactual perception”
(Ratcliffe, 2013) is closely associated with or partly constituted by
perception of one’s body: one cannot perceive the world tactually
without perceiving oneself in the process. As Merleau-Ponty
(1962, p. 316) famously pointed out, while vision “presents us
with a spectacle spread out before us at a distance,” in perceiving
the world through touch, “I cannot forget in this case that it
is through my body that I go to the world” (1962, p. 316). By
directly mediating the boundary between body and world, the
skin inescapably distinguishes yet relates body and world, as the
two faces of the same coin. As Martin notes (Martin, 1992, 1993,
1995), tactile feelings can simultaneously be perceptions of body
and/or of world.
4For example, some theorists argue that while we typically have access only to
the mental representation’s intentional content (something in the world which
it is about) without noticing its non-intentional carrier properties (Moore, 1903;
Harman, 1990; Tye, 1999), the process itself of constructing inner representations
can become available to our introspective attention. Whenever we consciously
direct our attention introspectively inwards, so to speak, the transparent processing
of mental representations (typically taken for granted and hence “invisible”)
becomes “opaque,” that is, “visible” and available to our attention (cf. the window
metaphor described above).
5We do not claim that touch is the most fundamental proximal sensory channel,
rather we outline its special role as a relational sense par excellence.We are grateful
to one anonymous reviewer for pressing clarification on this point.
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Lastly, but importantly, touch plays a key exploratory and
social bonding role, which confers on it a sense of “closeness”:
we touch things to make sure they are real, and we touch people
to make direct and close contact with them. As Fulkerson (2014)
notes, what distinguishes tactual experience from the other senses
is the fact that the former involves “exploratory binding”; it
relies upon actively manipulating (and being manipulated by)
the environment.
Up to now, we have motivated the claim that the body–world
relationship mediated via tactile perception remains tacitly and
ubiquitously in the background and the sense of self may be
inseparable from this relationship. In the next section, we suggest
that close tactile experiences may precede developmentally
more sophisticated forms of detached and distal perceptual
awareness—such as visuospatial perception (e.g., seeing an
apple). Well before humans are able to recognize themselves in
a mirror and to perceive themselves from a visuospatial distal
perspective, they experience themselves via proximal senses, such
as tactile experiences.
GETTING PERCEPTION OFF THE
GROUND: THE BASIC PROXIMAL SENSES
There is a growing consensus in philosophy, psychology, and
cognitive neuroscience that multisensory information about the
body plays a central role in structuring our basic sense of self
(Gallagher, 2000; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Specifically, the
interplay and coupling between (a) exteroceptive (e.g., vision,
audition) and (b) interoceptive senses (e.g., temperature, pain,
cardiac signals, breath, etc.) is a key component of our sense of
self (Park and Blanke, 2019). More recently, the PP framework
proponents argued that the basic experience of being a self is the
result of an ongoing inferential process based on a generative
model centered onto the bodily self (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013;
Hohwy, 2013, 2020; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth,
2013; Limanowski and Friston, 2018, 2020).
Biological agents, such as humans, act as “self-evidencing”
systems aiming at maximizing evidence for their self-model
as they minimize prediction errors (Hohwy, 2014). In short,
self-organizing systems need to constantly “check” and “prove”
themselves that they exist in a dynamic, constantly changing
and noisy world. The self is an inferred model of endogenous,
deeply hidden causes of behavior. It has been proposed that self-
modeling can be described as a two-step process: (i) first finessing
a model of the self and then (ii) engaging that model in action,
which spirals into further finessing of the model, and further
action, and so forth (Hohwy and Michael, 2017).
However, one basic yet overlooked aspect of current
embodied and PP approaches in both philosophy and cognitive
neuroscience is that brains (and minds), and human bodies, first
develop within another human body. The most basic models
of perceptions and actions emerge already in utero (Ciaunica,
2019; Ciaunica and Crucianelli, 2019; Quintero and de Jaegher,
2020; Ciaunica et al., 2021). Crucially, while not all humans will
have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the
experience of being carried and growing within another person’s
body is universal6 (Ciaunica et al., 2021).
In the remainder of this section, we provide evidence
illustrating that it is touch (and not vision) that is one of the
first of our senses to develop and affords us thereby with our
most basic and earliest means of “meeting” and perceiving both
the self and the external world (Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, 2017;
Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017; Ciaunica and Crucianelli, 2019).
In the womb, fetuses spend a significant amount of time
in tactile exploration of the boundary between innervated and
non-innervated regions (Mori and Kuniyoshi, 2010; Piontelli,
2014; Hata, 2016). For example, fetuses frequently touch certain
body areas, such as the lips, cheeks, ears, and parietal bone,
creating a self-stimulatory pattern, which enhances innervation.
Importantly, when the fetus touches the forehead, innervation
increases, and the boundary migrates (Piontelli, 2014). This
allows the fetus to move on in touching a new innervated
boundary, and the cycle repeats until the whole body is fully
innervated (Piontelli, 2010; Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay,
2013). Additionally, when the fetus touches itself, the placenta, or
a co-twin, it develops different kinematic and tactile patterns that
emerge, which differ in pressure, acceleration, and directedness
(Hata, 2016).
For example, Castiello et al. (2010) investigated the kinematic
profiles of movements in five pairs of twin fetuses by using four-
dimensional ultrasonography during two separate recording
sessions carried out at the 14th and 18th weeks of gestation. They
showed that by the 14th week of gestation, twin fetuses do display
not only movements directed toward the uterine wall and self-
directed movements but also movements specifically aimed at
the co-twin, the proportion of which increases between the 14th
and 18th gestational weeks. They also noted similar kinematic
profiles for movements directed toward the co-twin and self-
directed movements aimed at the eye-region, i.e., the most
delicate region of the body. They concluded that performance of
movements toward the co-twin is not accidental: already starting
from the 14th week of gestation, twin fetuses execute movements
specifically aimed at the co-twin. This has been reported in
singleton pregnancy as well, where kinematic studies seem to
suggest that motor planning is in place by 22 weeks of gestational
age (Zoia et al., 2007).
Moreover, it has been shown that maternal touch of her own
abdomen increases arm, head, and mouthing movements in the
fetus (Marx and Nagy, 2015), and that maternal touch has more
impact than maternal voice in the fetus’ movements. Notably,
tactile interactions require the “toucher” and “touched” to be
physically proximal, to “share” the experience of touch (passive or
active), and it is often accompanied by a cascade of other sensorial
information, such as the smell of the other person, the sound
of the tactile contact on the skin (think of the “noise” made by
a kiss), and temperature of the other body. Given the richness
of information provided by tactile interactions, it has been
hypothesized (Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, 2017; Fotopoulou and
Tsakiris, 2017) that social touch might represent a fundamental
6Throughout this paper, we will use the terms “pregnant person” and “mother”
interchangeably, irrespective of their self-identified gender.
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step in the development of both self- and other-awareness, as well
as self-other distinction (see McGlone et al., 2014 for a review).
Specifically, one type of pleasant touch, the so-called affective,
or sensual touch (i.e., slow, caress-like touch mediated, among
other, more classic tactile fibers, by the C Tactile afferent system,
Löken et al., 2009; Kirsch et al., 2020), has been re-defined as
an interoceptive7 modality since its primarily functional role
seems to be to provide information about the homeostatic and
emotional effects of touch, rather than the properties of what or
who is being touched. It has also been shown that the activation
of these CT receptors on the skin may specifically relate to
the positive consequences of interpersonal touch (see McGlone
et al., 2007), such as reducing feelings of social exclusion (von
Mohr et al., 2017), soothing pain (Krahé et al., 2016; von
Mohr et al., 2018), and communicating social support (Kirsch
et al., 2018). Indeed, related findings suggest that this system
may be specialized for processing not only affective touch but
also specifically social affective touch from early on in life (see
Morrison et al., 2010 for a review). Specifically, the fetus is
entirely covered in fine hair (i.e., lanugo hairs), and it has
been suggested that fetal movement in the amniotic fluid might
directly stimulate CTs afferent, which are known to activate the
hypothalamus and insular cortex, promoting an anti-stress effect
via realize of oxytocin and stimulating the fetal growth (Bystrova,
2009).
A second key example of early sensorimotor coordination
is self-touch and tactile perceptions. While a significant body
of research focused on the effect of auditory inputs (such as
maternal voice ormusic) on the fetal development, it is important
to bear in mind that in the womb, the most developed sensory
systems in fetuses are the tactile and olfactory ones, not the
visual or auditory ones. This suggests that the most basic way
to perceive oneself and the world is mediated through proximal
modalities (Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, 2017), such as touch,
interoception, and olfaction (Ciaunica and Crucianelli, 2019).
After birth, infants receive constant and proximal tactile
stimulations, which significantly reduce infant’s stress and
increase positive affect (Stack and Muir, 1992; Bellieni et al.,
2007). Affective touch is believed to play an important role in
the creation and maintenance of social bonding8 (see Morrison
et al., 2010 for a review) and more recently to the sense of
body ownership (Lloyd et al., 2013; van Stralen et al., 2014) and
self-identity (Panagiotopoulou et al., 2017).
We can summarize the argumentative backbone developed
so far as follows: if we grant the premise that the perception
7Interoception (the perception of bodily visceral signals) is taken to be uniquely
related to the generation of subjective feelings, informing the organism regarding
its levels of arousal and bodily needs (Craig, 2009; Seth, 2013). Even more
importantly, and contrary to classic views of interoception as “the perception of
the body from within,” the current notion of interoception is tightly linked to
homeostasis.Within this framework, interoceptive signals are considered crucial in
informing the organism regarding the homeostatic state of the body in relationship
to experiences originating from both within the organism (e.g., cardiac and
respiratory functions, digestion, hunger, and thirst) or outside it (e.g., taste, smell,
affective touch, and pain).
8Substantial literature in the context of attachment formation also supports the
facilitating role of touch in establishing the social bond between infant and
caregivers (Ainsworth, 1979; Weiss et al., 2000).
of incoming “whatever next” (Clark, 2013) sensory information
emerges from the processing of “whatever before,” i.e., priors or
“expectations,” then one needs to step back and have a closer
look at how perception gets off the ground from the outset. If we
endorse a bottom-up developmental perspective, then empirical
work points us to the idea that (discriminative and affective)
tactile inputs play a fundamental role in constituting perceptual
experiences in early life and beyond.
In the next section, we turn our attention to the special
relationship between touch, body, and what is next-to-our-skin.
We introduce the key notion of “the second skin” or “extended
skin” and explore them in relation to materials situated close to
our skin, i.e., our clothes. We claim that they constitute what one
may call, following Gallagher (2005), “extended” body-image and
body-schema. We turn to this discussion now.
(UN)COVERING OUR BODY—EXTENDING
THE TRANSPARENCY TO THE “SECOND
SKIN”
Most of the time, in our daily lives, our body is covered with
clothes. Textile are pervasive material objects enveloping closely
our skin. Clothes may thus play a peculiar role in our bodily
experiences. First, they seem to be at the same time visible
and invisible. Visible because they are tangible and on display
on our bodies and the bodies of others. Invisible, because we
tend to “forget” them in the background and to process them
“transparently” as defined above. Second, materials that envelop
our body allow individuals to closely relate to and exchange with
the external physical and social world.
Throughout human history, individuals ingeniously made
use of various materials close to their bodies—for protection,
comfort, and aesthetic aspects. Particularly, textiles and clothes,
which throughout the “long and intimate” (O’Connor, 2010)
connection with people, were key in symbolic representations of
self (e.g., identity, gender, age, class, political views, as well as a
variety of social values; Guy et al., 2001; Weber and Mitchell,
2004; Mida and Kim, 2015), in the reproduction of social order
(e.g., in making social differences visible, see Entwistle, 2000;
Breward, 2003; Crane, 2012), in embodying culture (memory,
history, and identity), and in “transforming, protecting, and
healing the human body” (O’Connor, 2010; see also Hansen,
2004; Brumfield, 2006). Many times, textiles have been used with
varying degrees of explicitness as a medium to record history
or to “provide a focus for the expression of conflict or reflect
commentary on current affairs” (Henderson, 1990). The latter
can be noticed, for example, in more codified manners, such as in
Ganseys9, or in a very explicit manner in t-shirts portraying rock
music bands or political messages, a style very much influenced
by Vivienne Westwood’s collaboration with Sex Pistols in the
1970s. Hence, we can view clothing as “the furniture of the mind
made visible” (Laver in Barnard, 2007, p. 2).
9A gansey (or guernsey) is a type of knitted woollen jumper, historically known
for being worn by fishermen around the coast of Britain. Their unique patterns
represented a village and a family, so that in the case of a shipwreck or accident,
the bodies could be identified and returned to their family for care or burial.
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This long and intimate relationship also endowed textiles
with magical, and at times humanlike, characteristics in people’s
imaginaries. Textiles may be perceived as being “alive” (e.g.,
designers describe textiles as an animated, living thing with
whom they engage in conversation to define what a textile wants
to be as a garment; for a full account, see Petreca et al., 2015), or,
as observed by Henderson (1990, p. 1,588) may be seen to “have
supernatural properties” (e.g., the invisibility cape inHarry Potter
novels), or “may be used as a metaphor for life” (e.g., “Penelope
rips out her weaving nightly in order to arrest the flow of time”),
or even to be “imbued with the characteristics of their wearers or
impart special qualities to them” (e.g., the widespread culture of
celebrities’ clothes auctioning, where pieces are sold at exorbitant
prices10).
The clothes lie at the interface of the body and its social
presentation, and they “signify to the wider world who and
what a person is trying to express” (Salgado-Montejo et al.,
2018). This symbolic level is rooted on the physical touch
basis of the experience of wearing, and we saw earlier that
this long and intimate, proximal experience grants textiles
“magical” perceptions of “being alive” and “being imbued with
the characteristics of their wearers.” Indeed, clothes have a unique
capacity to provide immediate feedback to an individual, the
wearer, affirming their sense of identity at a directly embodied
level (Twigg and Buse, 2013). Clothes can express largely
unconscious aspects both of an individual and of a group psyche
(Salgado-Montejo et al., 2018) and form a part of our non-
verbal communication, or what is defined by Lurie (2000), as a
“universal tongue.”
What we wear reflects our personality, or undressed self,
and therefore, it is a material manifestation of our beliefs
and behaviors, or “how we think and how we live” (Salgado-
Montejo et al., 2018, p. 2): “enclothed cognition is a bidirectional
phenomenon, with the wearer selecting clothes that reflect
his/her personality and clothing having an influence on cognitive
processing and behavior” (Salgado-Montejo et al., 2018, p.
2). For example, it has been suggested that people are
efficient and effective in forming impressions of someone’s
personality via clothing, specifically shoes (Gillath et al., 2012).
Furthermore, clothing can influence self-perception. People
wearing formal clothing considered themselves as competent
and rational (Hannover and Kühnen, 2002; Peluchette and Karl,
2007) and also have enhanced abstract cognitive processing (i.e.,
comprehensive mental representations) and increased perceived
social difference and power (Slepian et al., 2015).
In what follows, we suggest that the clothes may be
described as a “second skin” and as such they are an essential
component of the transparent experiential background defined
in the Perceptual Awareness and the Transparent Experiential
10This culture has reached the level of granting clothes and accessories even with
world records, such as the most expensive ever pair of trainers, which was worn
and signed by Michael Jordan, and sold at $560,000 at a Sotheby’s auction held





Background section. They “extend” the body’s schema and image.
In his seminal formulation, Gallagher defined (i) “body image” as
“a complex set of intentional states and dispositions, perceptions,
beliefs, and attitudes, in which the intentional object is one’s own
body” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 25). By contrast, (ii) the “body schema”
is a “non-conscious performance of the body, i.e., a performance
that is not an intentional object present to my consciousness”
(Gallagher, 2005, p. 548).
Interestingly, he points out that the body-schema can include
tools and artifacts as well:
“the carpenter’s hammer becomes an operative extension of the
carpenter’s hand, or as noted, the body schema extends to the
feather in the woman’s hat (see Gorman, 1969, p. 15). The
body schema is an active, operative performance of the body,
rather than a copy, image, global model, or conception of the
existing parts of the body. The schema is the body as it actively
integrated its position and responses in the environment. (...)
The body schema, understood this way, is not the perception of
‘my’ body; it is not the image, the representation, or even the
marginal consciousness of the body. Rather is it precisely the style
that organises the body as it functions in communion with its
environment” (Gallagher, 1986, p. 548–549).
The extended mind thesis famously defended by Clark and
Chalmers (1998) claims that the cognitive processes can be
“offloaded” or “extended” to reach beyond the boundaries
of individual, such as to include as proper parts aspects of
the individual’s physical and sociocultural environment (see
Kirchhoff andKiverstein, 2019 for a recent review). Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein (2019) use the example of a spider and its web: the
latter becomes transparent for the spider and perceives its prey
through the web. But how about bodily sensory processes? Can
they be “offloaded” or “extended” to reach beyond the boundaries
of the skin?
We suggest that some perceptual bodily experiences can be
extended through (i.e., transformed into) components that reach
beyond the sensory organ’s states (e.g., the skin) into what one
may call an “extended skin” or a “second skin.” Hence, the
transparency of tactile experiences may be “offloaded” into the
materials close to the skin. The notion of “offloading” refers
to the use of artifacts (here clothes) to manage and convey
information about the self. For example, clothes may be regarded
as a key component of what one may call an (i) “extended” body-
schema (e.g., regulating body temperature via warm clothes) and
(ii) “extended” body-image, contributing to the constitution of
one’s social (narrative) self via social signaling (e.g., wearing a
red T-shirt to signal that we support Arsenal football club; see
Colombetti, 2016).
The idea is that clothes are typically processed transparently,
in the background. This is because, by being so close to our skin,
they “inherit,” so to speak, the pervasiveness and transparency
of tactile experiences, which then “extends” to the clothes. The
skin being the largest of our sensory organ and given that most
of the time, most of our bodies (and hence skin) are covered by
clothes, this means that we may tacitly “sense” the world through
this interface. We can thus speak of an “extended transparency.”
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There is a robust body of work illustrating that our
representation of our own body and our bodily sensations does
not end on our skin; instead, the proximal space around the
body, known as the peripersonal space (PPS), is included in our
multisensory representation of the body (see Serino, 2019 for
a recent review). Early neurophysiological studies in primates
identified a specific population of multi-sensory neurons that
selectively responded to external stimuli, but only when the
somatosensory, visual, or auditory stimulation occurred close to
and not far from the body (Rizzolatti et al., 1981). Subsequent
neuropsychological (e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 1997; Làdavas,
2002; di Pellegrino and Làdavas, 2015), psychophysiological (e.g.,
Maravita et al., 2002, 2003), and neuroimaging (e.g., Bremmer
et al., 2002; Blanke et al., 2015; Cléry et al., 2015) studies showed
that the processing of tactile information is strongly affected by
external stimuli presented close to the body, further cementing
the notion that a similar system in humans exists.
This space representation is thought to be dynamic rather than
static, so as to maximize the processing of relevant events for
the self, expanding, and shrinking depending on environment
specificities. Moreover, sociological and anthropological studies
have revealed the role of PPS in the type and strength of social and
cultural interactions (Hall et al., 1968; Sommer, 1969; Hall, 1990;
Felipe and Sommer, 2017). More recently, social neuroscience
brought these ideas together to show that interacting proximally
with another person influences how we perceive not only our
own body but also the space around it, depending on our precise
relationship with that person and howmuch we trust them (Heed
et al., 2010; Teneggi et al., 2013).
A detailed discussion of the fascinating topic of the role
of PPS in constituting self-representations and our sense of
self lies beyond the topic of this paper11. Here, we retain
the idea of a literally “close relationship” between clothes and
bodily self-experiences.
Note that there is an important distinction between “extended
body schema” in tool as opposed to clothes (daily) experiences12.
Take for example a blindman’s stick. A successful tool use in
this case implies that the individual successfully attends to the
tip of the stick in order to explore and perceive its environment:
she/he can “see” with the stick. The same goes for the carpenter’s
hammer: he needs to attend to the hammer’s contact with the
nail in order to hit it correctly. In some cases, the tools may
become transparent too13: think of a person expertly typing on a
laptop keyboard while focusing entirely on the letters appearing
on the screen. However, the link between the keyboard and the
letter appearance needs to be available for attention, in order to
correctly perform the task. If the letters appear on the screen with
a delay after I have hit the keyboard, then the transparency breaks
down, and I may need to bring my attention to the keyboard
itself. In other words, there is an instrumental, functional role in
the tool use that requires attention in some way or another.
11See de Vignemont and Iannetti (2015) for an interesting discussion on different
forms of PPS.
12We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing clarification on this point.
13We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing extra clarification on this
point.
By contrast, everyday clothes may blend into the background
unnoticed. They also need to be comfortable such as we
can afford to dis-attend and “forget” about them. In other
words, to process them via what one may call an extended
transparent experiential background. Unless these proximal
tactile experiences become unpleasant or uncomfortable (rough
materials, itchy, dry skin), in which case they become “opaque”
and emerge at the surface of our awareness. There are cases where
clothes are deliberately brought into the foreground, to signal
power and social status: think of a king wearing a heavy ermine
mantle. The key idea here is that by mediating the boundaries
between our bodies and the environment, clothes also seem to
have an ambivalent role: they are simultaneously covering the
intimacy of the self while uncovering the self to signal status and
power to the public eye.
Up to now, we focused on proximal perceptual experiences
as mediated by touch. We took the example of clothes close to
our body and suggested that tactile experiences mediated via
the skin and the “second skin” become pervasive, transparent
and allows what Gallagher called above a “communion with
its environment”.
In the last section of our paper, we examine some of the
implications of shifting the focus from visuo-spatial to proximal
perceptual experiences in relation to our sense of self and sense
of presence in the world. Specifically, we briefly describe the case
of Depersonalization, a condition that makes people estranged
and detached from their self, body, and world. We discuss some
empirically testable hypotheses, to be developed in the future
work, highlighting the key role of proximal tactile interactions
with the environment on one’s sense of self and sense of presence
in the world. If correct, our hypotheses may fruitfully contribute
to designing body-based and dynamic interventions helping to
alleviate feelings of self-estrangement and social alienation in




While traditionally theorists have been concerned mainly with
the subject–object polarity in describing perceptual experiences,
throughout this paper, we aimed at drawing attention at what
is happening in between these two poles. For this reason, we
proposed to shift our focus from visuo-distal perception (easier
to structure around a subject/object axis) to proximal perception
(and particularly on touch), where the key role of mediating
boundaries becomes more evident. Contrary to the standard
approach that views the skin (and tactile experiences) as a mere
border separating the self and world, here we propose that the
skin (and its extended version, “the second skin,” i.e., the clothes)
simultaneously and inherently distinguishes and connects the
bodily self to its environment.
Wemotivate this shift in light of the new and highly influential
PP theories of perception. As we saw in the Perceptual Awareness
and the Transparent Experiential Background section, one
key idea behind embodied cognition and PP accounts is
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that perceptual experiences are deeply depended on dynamic
engagements and reciprocal interactions with others and the
environment (Gibson, 1979; Schilbach et al., 2013). If this
approach is correct, then our sense of self and presence or
immersiveness in the world may crucially depend on how we
relate with our social and physical surroundings. To put it in a
slogan: the more we interact with the world and others, the more
we gain information about ourselves.
Crucially, human bodies do not emerge in a vacuum. Indeed,
one fundamental yet overlooked aspect of our embodiment is
that the human organism emerges and develops within another
human body. While the experience of pregnancy has been
traditionally linked to a certain category of individuals (pregnant
persons), to date, all humans shared their bodies with the
body of another person. Consequently, one needs to adapt and
extend the notion of embodiment to reflect the fundamental
and universal body-within-a-body case, what it has been termed
co-embodiment (Ciaunica et al., 2021).
The regulation of the two agents’ states–and particularly the
need to maintain physiological stability despite a fluctuating and
unpredictable environment–is actively negotiated between the
two organisms that share for a given amount of time (typically
9 months) common bodily and environmental resources.
Importantly, humans start to perceive themselves and to relate
to their close environment, already in the womb, via proximal
senses (such as touch) way before vision. After birth, human
babies are unable to self-regulate their own homeostatic balance;
hence, they fundamentally depend on close physical interactions
with dedicated caregivers for survival (Ciaunica and Fotopoulou,
2017; Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017; Ciaunica et al., 2021).
As toddlers and adults, we actively explore our proximal
surroundings and touch objects to make sure they are real.
Since all humans have started their experiential journey as
babies within another’s body, the co-embodied and relational
aspect of perceptual experiences may constitute the basis of our
fundamental sense of self.
While there is growing awareness that perceptual experiences
are multisensory in nature (Faivre et al., 2017), in this paper,
we narrowed our focus on the inescapably dual touchant/touché
structure of the tactile experiences. This reciprocity and duality
place touch in a key position highlighting the inherent relatedness
of our bodies with its close physical and social world.We propose
to label this overlooked relational background mediated by the
proximal senses–and particularly by touch–as a “transparent
experiential bridge” that is there without us being aware that it
is there. One key question that further work needs to address
is the nature of the link between the phenomenological sense
of self and this experiential bridge. How does this relationality
of our experiences at their most primitive stages fits within the
traditional picture of pre-reflective self-awareness or minimal self
as being fundamental to all experiences?
While we cannot do justice to this question in this paper, the
remainder of this section, we would like to suggest that in daily
life, healthy humans constantly use this transparent bridge to
communicate and to relate with the world and others, without
paying too much attention to its “invisible” and “transparent”
underlying structure and pillars, so to speak. However, the
importance of this key relatedness becomes apparent especially
when this “transparency” breaks down and people start feeling
unreal and disconnected from their selves, bodies, and the
world14.
As Ratcliffe rightly points out, people usually talk about a
self as distinct from the body whenever they feel something is
disrupted or amiss with the self: something that has gone wrong
or something that is lacking. To use our initial metaphor: we
notice more easily the existence of a transparent window when
its glass cracks (Ciaunica et al., 2020). When the mediating
function of transparent senses gets disrupted, people may feel
disconnected from their self, body, and world (Ciaunica et al.,
2021).
Initially described by Dugas in 1898 (Sierra and Berrios,
1998), Depersonalization/Derealisation Disorder (DP/DR) is
a condition characterized by profound alterations of one’s
sense of self (Sierra and David, 2011), typically inducing
distressing feelings of detachment or estrangement from one’s self
(depersonalization) and/or one’s surroundings (derealization)
(DSM IV-TR fourth edition, text revision 2000)15. DP/DR
typically co-occurs in association with highly traumatic events or
as symptoms of anxiety, panic, and depression.
These dramatic alterations are typically experienced as a
“split” or a “fracture” between an external observing agent and
an observed self, body, and world: “My perception felt as though
it had been drawn back inside my head, almost as though I was
looking at the world from the back of my head, and could see the
back of my own eye sockets. (...) Essentially, it felt like there was
a divorce or fracture between the world and me so that although
my body was still in the world, my mind was only an observer”
(Ciaunica et al., 2020, p. 6).
The experienced self-split or self-detachment occurs on
multiple levels, as it is associated with (a) detachment from one’s
body or body parts (low-level sensory and bodily aspects of the
self); (b) detachment from one’s subjective feelings and emotions
(experiential aspects); and (c) disconnection from one’s personal
stories, memories, thoughts, and future plans, often described by
sufferers as a lack of a narrative16 or a “plot” in one’s life (Ciaunica
and Charlton, 2018). The overall impact of this “self-split” makes
14For example, the current social isolation provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic
may reveal the importance of this tacit and “transparent” connectedness that we
typically (before COVID) took it for granted.
15The other major classificatory system used in contemporary psychiatry is the
ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases, World Health Organisation).
While there are some important differences between DSM and ICD, both largely
agree upon the diagnostic criteria for DPD, which are the following: (a) persistent
symptoms of DP/DR not occurring as part of another disorder or be directly
substance-induced; (b) the individual should not be suffering from psychosis
(which would imply a different diagnosis, such as schizophrenia). DSM adds the
criterion (c) there should be significant distress and/or functional impairment.
This seems appropriate, as otherwise it is hard to argue that the phenomena can
usefully be seen as pathological (Medford et al., 2005).
16“Now I experience depersonalisation more of a lack of narrative; moments seem
to melt away as soon as they have passed and life appears to pass as a series of
unrelated frames. (...) Youmay be able to function, but creating a credible narrative
for your life would be challenging” (Ciaunica and Charlton, 2018).
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people feel “not fully real” (Simeon and Abugel, 2008; Sierra,
2009; Medford, 2012).
The prevalence of DPD is around 1–2% in the general
population (Hunter et al., 2004), with onset typically occurring
before age 25. Strikingly, feelings of depersonalization are
the third most common psychological symptom reported
in the general population (after anxiety and low mood),
especially among young people (Simeon et al., 2003). Yet, the
underlying neural and computational mechanisms as well as its
phenomenological markers remain poorly understood (see Seth
et al., 2011 for an early attempt).
The experience of a “split” between the self and the body–
strikingly described as feeling trapped in one’s head (mind)
and outside one’s body (Ciaunica et al., 2020)–is one of the
most frequently cited symptoms in DPD (Sierra and David,
2011). Sierra (2009) lists four prominent types of anomalous
body experiences in DPD: (1) lack of body ownership, (2)
feelings of loss of agency, (3) disembodiment feelings, and
(4) somatosensory distortions. Empirical evidence for this
disrupted bodily sensory processing comes from studies that
report disrupted physiological responses in patients with DPD,
compared with healthy participants (Sierra et al., 2002; Owens
et al., 2015; Dewe et al., 2018). DPD has also been linked
to disrupted activity in neuronal regions underlying somatic
processing (Medford et al., 2012; Lemche et al., 2013) and the
vestibular system (Jáuregui Renaud, 2015), which is responsible
for providing information about the body’s position in space
(Ferrè and Haggard, 2016).
A detailed discussion on this condition would lead to a
substantial digression (see Simeon and Abugel, 2008; Sierra,
2009; Sierra and David, 2011; Medford, 2012; Billon, 2016;
Ciaunica et al., 2020). Here, we propose to narrow our focus on
relational aspects between the self and the world, dramatically
reported by a patient as follows:
“When the depersonalization is very deep, I still seek to ’be’
someone else because it feels like that constant source of
interaction is the only thing that allows me to maintain a
connection with the world. I’ll also seek physical contact with
whoever I’m with. It almost feels as though I need to be that other
person because my own sense of self is not strong enough in that
moment to sustain me” (Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, 2017).
This observation may be crucial for potential interventions and
therapies designed to make DPD people aware of what still
connects them with their self, body, and the world, despite the
fact that they feel dramatically alienated. Specifically, future work
needs to disentangle and contrast the role of proximal vs. distal
senses in shaping the experience of being a self-present in the
world and fully connected with one’s body.
If our argumentation throughout our paper is correct, then
future research needs to assess whether active engagements with
the world and others via proximal (tactile and multisensory)
interactions enhance the sense of self, realness, and presence
in people with DPD. By contrast, we speculate that distant
visuospatial experiences–such as seeing/recognizing oneself in
the mirror–will enhance feelings of estrangement and self-
detachment, of being inside one’s head.Moreover, we hypothesize
that close and dynamic physical and synchronous interactions
with their environment will make DPD people feel more present
in their bodies, and less “trapped” in their minds. This is because,
paradoxically, in order to get closer to one’s self, one needs to be
able to “forget” oneself (Ciaunica, 2020, submitted) and to be able
to open to the world and others, via proximal tactile interactions.
The accent thus needs to be put on what connects us to
ourselves and the reality, as opposed to what separates us from
it, especially when we feel isolated and alienated. To use our
metaphor, even if the transparent bridge that connects people
with their self, body, and world is shattered, it is important to
stress that it remains available and can be crossed. As Ratcliffe
insightfully notes: “talk of feeling detached from body and world
might best express an all-pervasive feeling of estrangement but,
importantly, that feeling is itself a way of experiencing the body–
world relationship and so one has not actually escaped from
body and world at all” (2008, p. 131). We must thus use this
fundamental connectedness to the world as a powerful tool to
repair the “lost” connectedness to one’s self.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
While traditionally perceptual experiences have been described as
having a subject–object polarity, throughout this paper, we aimed
at drawing attention at its relational aspect, i.e., what is happening
in between these two poles, especially when the sensory signals
are proximal as opposed to distal. Shifting focus from visuo-
distal perception (easier to structure around a subject/object axis)
to proximal perception (and particularly on touch) allowed us
to outline the key relational role of tactile interactions with the
physical and social environment. We motivated this shift in light
of the new and highly influential PP theories of perception.
If indeed whatever we perceive now is infused by whatever is
perceived before, then it becomes crucial to endorse a dynamic
and situated viewpoint in examining perception.
We argued that the term “next” here must include not only
the temporal aspect (i.e., the processing of upcoming inputs)
but also the spatial dimension (i.e., the processing of upcoming
inputs next-to-my-body). This is because accurate information
processing of proximal sensory signals is key to the organism’s
survival in the here and now.
We narrowed our focus on tactile proximal interactions that
are close to our bodies. We explored the special relationship
between touch and body, and argued in line with the
phenomenological accounts, that tactile experiences form a
pervasive yet transparent experiential background, typically
unnoticed and taken for granted. The key claim was that
the body–world relationship remains tacitly and ubiquitously
in the background and the sense of self is inseparable from
this relationship.
To support this claim, we reviewed developmental empirical
work that points to the idea that (discriminative and affective)
tactile inputs play a fundamental role in constituting perceptual
experiences in utero and in early life. We then explored the
idea that our transparent experiential background includes
also garments (i.e., objects and materials close-to-our-
skin) that can be viewed as a “second skin” or “extended
skin.” As such, they constitute what one may call, following
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Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Gallagher (2005) seminal
formulations, an “extended” body-image and body-schema.
Our speculative proposal stipulates that proximal and
tactile perceptual engagements with the physical and social
world may form a pervasive yet transparent experiential
bridge, typically unnoticed and taken for granted. Keeping
this “bridge” open is essential in constituting the feeling of
being real, present, and immersed in the world, especially
when one’s sense of self is shattered, as in the case of
Depersonalization Disorder. If this is so, then future work
and interventions need to focus on initiating and restoring
dynamic and proximal engagements with our social and physical
world in order to rebuild the “invisible” transparent yet
essential basis of our sense of self and sense of presence in
the world.
In line with this approach, we have recently piloted the
sense of connection through touch in a set of experiential
interventions with the microphenomenologist (Petitmengin
et al., 2018). We have explored the aspect of quality of
movements in textile experience further with designers through
the Micro-phenomenology interview method17 (Petitmengin,
2006; Petitmengin et al., 2013, 2018) to go deeper into pre-
verbal and non-verbal experiences (i.e., movement and touch
behavior).
17This method combines psychology and phenomenology approaches to obtain
a first-person, fine-grained verbal description of subjective experience that is
generally inaccessible or difficult to articulate (Varela and Shear, 1999), and it
reduces post-rationalization (Hogan et al., 2015). By using specific guidance
(through questions and non-verbal cues), it helps people to become aware of
nuances in the experience being described (Petitmengin et al., 2013). Hence, the
method is presented as a “psychological microscope” (Bitbol and Petitmengin,
2013).
18A video detailing an excerpt of the experiment can be found here https://www.
eer.info/activities/being-aware-sharpening-our-tools.
Briefly, participants explored with their hands and with closed
eyes unknown objects for an extended time. They were then
invited to share the experiences focusing on how they became
aware of the interface of touch. Participants typically used
images that were porous: “I felt fuzziness” often integrating
social and spatial domains; “I felt open toward you.” Some
would spontaneously describe a difference between touching and
being touched. This distinction was subsequently frontloaded
(Gallagher, 2003) into an exploration of another object.
Participants were again invited to share these experiences,
particularly noticing the distinction between touching and
being touched, and on how sense of self and agency was
experienced18. Such simple intervention appears to have the
potentials to make visible those processes that connect us
to our surroundings in ways that are both proximal and
intimate. Future research will explore this in the context
of depersonalization and other disturbances in embodied
self-perception.
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